

Message Text

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

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USCINCEUR

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E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: DRAFT OF "ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIA-
TIONS" -- SECTION III NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

REF: USNATO 3963

WE BELIEVE THAT THE SPC SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO DRAFTING
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THE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION IN SECTION II, AND THAT
DETAILED DRAFTING WORK ON SECTION III SHOULD BE DEFERRED.
MEANWHILE, USNATO SHOULD CIRCULATE A US DRAFT FOR SECTION
III IN THE HOPE THAT AN IMPROVED TEXT CAN BE PREPARED BY

THE IS BEFORE SPC UNDERTAKES A DISCUSSION OF DETAILS FOR USE AS A BASIS OF THAT DISCUSSION. OUR IMMEDIATE TACTICAL OBJECTIVE IN PRESENTING THE NEW DRAFT IS TO ATTEMPT TO GAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THE FOUR STEPS WE ENVISAGE IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. AGREEMENT ON THIS PATTERN FOR THE INITIAL STAGE SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE FAIRLY DIRECTLY AND IN A REASONABLE TIME TO DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS LIMITING TENDENCIES OF SOME ALLIES TO SHY AWAY FROM THIS CENTRAL ASPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS. WORK ON THIS DRAFT SHOULD ALSO HELP GETTING ALLIES TO APPRECIATE THAT A VIABLE AND EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING APPROACH SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GRADUALLY UNFOLDING A BASIC POSITION AND HAMMERING AWAY AT IT WITH THE EAST, A THAT IT IS NOT PRACTICAL IN A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION LIKE MBFR TO USE TRADITIONAL TACTICS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATION INCLUDING TRADING FAT AND FALL BACKS. TEXT OF US DRAFT OF SECTION III FOLLOWS:

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

1. THIS SECTION CONTAINS ALLIED THINKING ON THE STRATEGY OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, I.E., THE FIRST TWO TO FOUR MONTHS. IN PARTICULAR IT DISCUSSES THE MAJOR STEPS IN PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED POSITION TO THE EAST, AS WELL AS THE QUESTIONS OF WHEN AND HOW THOSE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN.

2. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO FORESEE THE ENTIRE COURSE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS OR TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SCARCITY OF AUTHORITY INFORMATION ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS PRECLUDE THIS.

3. AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIED
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NEGOTIATORS WILL, IN FACT, BE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE EAST'S ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST WILL ADD TO ALLIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WARSAW PACT'S OBJECTIVES, WILL REVEAL SOME OF ITS STRATEGY AND COULD THEREFORE HAVE AN EFFECT UPON THE ATTITUDES TO BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIES. IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THESE CONDITIONS FOR NATO TO SEEK TO DEFINE ITS STRATEGY FOR MORE THAN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, THINKING ON STRATEGY MUST IN THE NATURE OF THINGS REMAIN OPEN.

4. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE ALLIES ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WHICH REQUIRES FREQUENT SHIFTS IN THEIR BASIC POSITION.

WHILE IT MIGHT BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO BUILD A SERIES OF POSITIONS AND FALLBACKS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE TRADING ROOM, SUCH AN APPROACH WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR A LARGE, COMPLEX MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION LIKE MBFR. ALLIED UNITY, WHICH WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR COMMON PURPOSES IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WILL REQUIRE COORDINATION OF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, AND SUCH COORDINATION NECESSARILY TAKES TIME. WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL FIND NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION TO PARLIAMENTS, AND IN LESSER DETAIL TO PUBLIC OPINION. AN INITIAL POSITION WITH SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL DEMANDS ON THE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT BE PLAUSIBLE, AND FREQUENT SHIFTS TO FALLBACK POSITIONS WOULD BE CONFUSING AND UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE. MOREOVER, IF THE WEST WERE TO ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN FROM DELIBERATELY INFLATED POSITIONS, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY

DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE ALLIED STRATEGY AND ITS FALLBACKS FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE EAST. AT THE END OF SUCH A PROCESS, THE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE TO FACE THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING THE EAST THAT ITS BASIC POSITION WAS IN FACT SERIOUSLY INTENDED.

5. TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE MOST EFFECTIVE GENERAL APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO TAKE A FIRM BASIC POSITION AND TO STICK TO IT AS THE WESTERN SIDE ATTEMPTS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATION THROUGH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GENERALIZATION DOWN TO THE SPECIFICS OF ACTUAL AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE A CARDINAL POINT OF NEGOTIATION.

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TIATING STRATEGY FOR THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR AGREED POSITION WITH MAXIMUM CONSISTENCY, DETERMINATION AND PERSISTENCE.

6. THE INITIAL STAGE -- WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY LAST SOME TWO TO FOUR MONTHS -- WOULD INCLUDE THE PRESENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL VIEWPOINTS ON BOTH SIDES, EXPLORATION OF ATTITUDES, AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. IT WOULD CULMINATE WITH AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A NEGOTIATION LEADING TO AN AGREEMENT ON PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS.

STEPS IN INITIAL STAGE

7. THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR STEPS:

8. OPENING STATEMENTS. OPENING STATEMENTS IN PLENARY SESSION WOULD BE OF A GENERAL, PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTER. THEY WOULD BE BASED UPON AGREED ALLIANCE POLICY WITH THE DETAILS COORDINATED IN THE AD HOC GROUP IN MEETINGS STARTING IN BRUSSELS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

TIATIONS ON OCTOBER 30.

9. THEMATIC MATERIAL FOR THE OPENING STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUCH THAT IT WILL

-- BE SUPPORTED BY ALL ALLIED PARTICIPANTS.

-- DRIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OUTCOMES PREFERRED BY THE ALLIES.

-- CREDIBLE AND DEFENDABLE VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SIDE.

-- REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE EYES OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION.

-- LEAVE ROOM FOR MANEUVER AND REFINEMENTS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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10. DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES. AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF OPENING STATEMENTS, FURTHER PLENARY SESSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO PRESENTATIONS DEVELOPING THE MAIN THEMES OF THE WESTERN STATEMENTS, INCLUDING SUCH MATTERS AS ASYMMETRIES IN THE MILITARY SITUATIONS OF EAST AND WEST, THREATENING ELEMENTS, THE NEED FOR PARITY AND A COMMON CEILING. THIS DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES WILL DESCRIBE THE OVERALL PROBLEM AS THE ALLIES SEE IT AND WILL DEFINE AND EMPHASIZE THE GENERAL CONCEPTS ON WHICH THE ALLIES WILL RELY IN THE FURTHER STAGES OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL SET FORTH THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT IN WHICH SPECIFIC ALLIED PROPOSALS WILL LATER BE DEVELOPED.

11. THE EAST FOR ITS PART WILL PROBABLY ALSO FOLLOW UP ITS OPENING STATEMENTS WITH FURTHER ELABORATION. THIS EXCHANGE OF AMPLIFYING STATEMENTS WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A GENERAL EXPLORATION OF EACH SIDE'S VIEWPOINT.

12. FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO TIE TOGETHER THE STRANDS DEVELOPED IN THE EXPOSITION OF MAJOR THEMES BY THE INITIAL PRESENTATION OF AN ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. IT WOULD INCLUDE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN SECTION II OF THIS PAPER.

13. AT THIS POINT, THE WESTERN PRESENTATION WOULD STILL BE IN GENERAL TERMS AND WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THE EAST TO REACT TO IT IN A DEFINITIVE MANNER. PRECISELY HOW SPECIFIC THE ALLIES WILL BE IN ILLUSTRATING THIS INITIAL PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WITH

ACTUAL NUMBERS DRAWN FROM THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN SECTION II WILL DEPEND UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION WHICH OBTAINS AT THAT TIME. AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIES BELIEVE THAT THIS PRESENTATION SHOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER INTO DETAIL THAN A FEW KEY FIGURES TO INDICATE THE PARAMETERS OF THEIR POSITION; E.G., THE 700,000 MAN FIGURE FOR THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE AND THE TANK ARMY AND 15 PERCENT FIGURES FOR THE FIRST PHASE.

14. PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD
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THEN MOVE TO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE FIRST TOPIC TO BE TREATED IN MORE DETAIL THAN HAD BEEN DONE BEFORE WOULD BE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD ENGAGE IN A VIGOROUS EFFORT TO PROBE SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE TOPIC AND TO

GET THE SOVIETS INTO NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WILL BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO HAVE FIRST SKETCHED OUT THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE ALLIES' OVERALL POSITION IN WHICH THE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD FIND THEIR PLACE; THE ALLIES WOULD THUS HAVE ANTICIPATED PROBABLE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS WITHOUT REGARD TO REDUCTIONS. DEPENDING ON HOW THE EAST REACTS, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. IF SUCH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE A FURTHER DETERMINATION OF WHAT DEGREE OF FORMALITY MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

15. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS TOPIC WOULD CONCLUDE THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE ALLIES CONCEIVE IT. THE NEXT STEP OF THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A SIMILARLY DETAILED AND INTENSIVE PRESENTATION OF ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING CONCERTED JUSTIFICATION AND ADVOCACY OF THE WHOLE REDUCTION PROGRAM LEADING TO THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE.

16. PROCEDURES AND AGENDA. THE ALLIES WOULD NOT SEEK TO MAKE A SEPARATE STAGE OR STEP OF A DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES OR AGENDA, LEST SOME OF THE SATISFACTORY RESULTS OF THE VIENNA PREPARATORY TALKS BE PUT AT HAZARD.

17. IN PARTICULAR, THE ALLIES WOULD RESIST ANY EASTERN ATTEMPT TO INVITE OTHER COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE TALKS OR TO RENEW THEIR PROPOSAL TO USE A SINGLE WORKING GROUP AS A VEHICLE FOR NARROWING THE EXISTING SCOPE OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY TO THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

18. REGARDLESS OF THE SEQUENCE OF MAIN TOPICS DE-
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CIDED ON BY THE ALLIES FOR THE INITIAL STAGE, IT WOULD
APPEAR FRUITLESS TO SEEK TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT ON
AN AGENDA INCORPORATING THIS SEQUENCE. CERTAIN POINTS,
SUCH AS THE MODALITIES OF THE PRESENTATION OF OPENING
STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES AND A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF DEVEL-
OPMENT OF MAIN THEMES FROM THESE STATEMENTS, WOULD NOT
BE CONTROVERSIAL AND COULD BE SETTLED INFORMALLY PRIOR TO
THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON OCTOBER 30. BUT EFFORTS
TO GAIN SOVIET CONCURRENCE TO INCLUDE, IN AN AGREED AGENDA,
TOPICS SUCH AS THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL OR INDIVIDUAL
ITEMS LIKE THE COMMON CEILING OR PRE-RED

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